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NoTEs AND COMMENTS
PROPERTY AND ESTATES
LIFE ESTATE WITH A LIMITED POWER OF DISPOSITION
The testator gave real and personal property to his widow, his
sole heir, for the duration of her life with a remainder to a hospital
and church. He also gave his widow a power of sale or gift in fee
simple, but provided that the property remaining at her death should
not descend to her heirs or pass by her will. The widow, without
mention of her power of alienation, executed a quit claim trust deed
and an assignment of the personal property to the defendant in trust
for herself for life and on her death, in trust for charities of her
own choice. The testator's executor asks for a construction of the
will. Held, the widow had only a life estate in the real and personal
property but her deed and assignment executed her power of aliena-
tion and conveyed a fee simple.
It is usually stated that the interest given by a will depends upon
the intent of the testator.2 However, where an estate is given to the
first tennant in general terms, without words of inheritance, and is
coupled with an absolute power of disposition, a fee simple will be
created.4 The same result is reached although the will provides for
a remainder in case of intestacy.5 But, even though the estate is
given in general terms in the introductory clause, a life estate is
created if the testator limits the power of alienation and provides for
a remainder of the undisposed property.6 At one time, the Indiana
1 Crawfordsville Trust Co. v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 25 N.E. (2d)
626 (Ind. 1940). The will in the principal ease did not in express
terms give the widow a power to convey more than her life estate
but the court assumed that she had the power to convey a fee
simple. This would seem to be correct. Clark v. Middiesworth,
82 Ind. 240 (1882). If the widow had had a fee simple interest
in the property then, of course, she conveyed that interest even
though she did not properly exercise her power of alienation.
2 Grise v. Weiss, 213 Ind. 3, 11 N.E. (2d) 146 (1937).
3 The Indiana courts have not always used the expression "absolute
power of disposition" to mean the same thing. As used in the
principal case and in this note it means a power to convey by
deed or will without limitation to classes or purposes.
4 Mulvane v. Rude, 146 Ind. 476, 45 N.E. 659 (1896). Note (1931)
75 A.L.R. 71. See South v. South, 91 Ind. 221, 222 (1883); Wiley
v. Gregory, 135 Ind. 647, 652, 35 N.E. 507, 508-9 (1893). "A
devise of an estate generally, or indefintely with a power of dis-
position over it, carries a fee." 4 KENT, COMM. (13th ed. 1884)
§ 319.
SMulvane v. Rude, 146 Ind. 476, 45 N.E. 659 (1896), held that a fee
simple was created and that such remainder was void. Logan v.
Sills, 28 Ind. App. 170, 62 N.E. 459 (1902).
G.Tohn v. Bradbury, 97 Ind. 263 (1884) (could sell for necessities and
comfort); accord, Rusk v. Zuck, 147 Ind. 388, 45 N.E. 691 (1897);
2 simms, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 596. These rules
should probably be regarded as aids to ascertain the testamentary
intent. Wiley v. Gregory, 135 Ind. 647, 35 N.E. 507 (1893). The
court in the principal case seemed to say that the intent was clear
from the reading of the document and that the dispute was
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Supreme Court held that if an estate was expressly limited for life
in the first instance, it would not be enlarged into a fee simple by
an absolute power of disposition.7 Later Van Gorder v. Smith modi-
fied this doctrine to the extent that an express life estate, at least
in personal property, will be enlarged into an absolute interest if
the testator makes no disposition of the remainder.S It was conceded
that the widow had the power under the will to create a trust and
provide that, at her death, the beneficial or legal interest 9 should pass
to specified beneficiaries. Such a power is as great as the power of
disposition by will, and since the widow could alienate by deed, she had
the equivalent of an absolute power of disposition2O Since both Van Gor-
der v. Smith". and the principal case involved personal property,12 the
cases are distinguishable only because the will in the principal case
disposed of the property remaining at the death of the life tenant.1 3
whether this intent was in conflict with these established rules
of law.
7 In Dunning v. Vandusen, 47 Ind. 423 (1874), the widow was given
an express life estate coupled with a power of disposition by deed
or will without limitation. The court held that she had but a life
estate, citing 4 EENT, COMM. (13th ed. 1884) § 319, that, " . . .
where the estate is given for life only, the devisee takes an es-
tate for life, though a power of disposition or to appoint the fee
by deed or will, be annexed; unless there should be some manifest
general intent of the testator which would be defeated by adhering
to this general intent." However, this case was incorrect on an-
other point, which had it been decided correctly, would have made
this statement dictum.
8Van Gorder v. Smith, 99 Ind. 404 (1885) (precatory words indicat-
ing a. trust held to fail and the widow had a fee simple subject
to no trust whatsoever ); Grant v. Mullen, 15 Del.Ch. 174, 138
Atl. 613 (ch. 1926). Contra: Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 515 (1879).
But an express life estate is not enlarged into a fee simple if
the power of alienation must be exercised by deed. Wiley v. Greg-
ory, 135 Ind. 647, 35 N.E. 507 (1893) (emphasized that testator
disposed of the remainder); Wood v. Robertson, 113 Ind. 323, 15
N.E. 457 (1887); see Downie v. Buennagel, 94 Ind. 228, 233 (1884).
9 This case goes no further than to hold she might create an equitable
interest to take effect at her death, but it would seem that she
might also have provided that, at her death, the trustee should
convey the legal interest to the beneficiaries named.
10 The court said that the widow was not given an unlimited (absolute)
power of disposition probably because she could not dispose of the
property by will. But she could, and did, do the same thing that
she could have done by will.
11 Van Gorder v. Smith, 99 Ind. 404 (1885).
12 The court in Van Gorder v. Smith, 99 Ind. 404 (1885), refused to
extend the rule of that case to real estate because only personal
property was in dispute. Although the principal case involved
real estate, it does not clear up that difficulty and indicate a
different rule in regard to real estate because the cases are dis-
tinguishable on the ground that this will disposed of the remainder.
is It might have been argued that the deed of trust executed by the
widow was beyond her power since the testator provided that she
could not dispose of the property by will. In general, the authori-
ties in other states are in accord with Indiana on the rules above.
Notes (1925) 36 A.L.R. 1177, (1932) 76 A.L.R. 1153.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The remainder to the church and hospital vested at the death of
the testator because it was certain to come into effect although the
time when it would do so was uncertain. 4 The fact that it might be
reduced in amount or even destroyed by the exercise of the power of
alienation acts merely as a condition subsequent to vesting.' 5 Fur-
theremore, the fact that the amount of the remainder could not be
ascertained at the death of the testator should not be held to render
it void.' 6
It was admitted that the widow had the power to convey a fee
simple, but her quit claim deed did not refer to her power of disposi-
tion and the assignment of the personal property held by her hus-
band's executor contained inconsistent statements. 7 A life tenant
may exercise his power of alienation in fee even though he does not
refer to his power in the conveyance if his intent is otherwise clear.' s
However, this intent cannot be inferred but must be clearly proved.' 9
It may be shown by the fact that the instrument describes the interest
which is the subject of the power or would be inoperative unless it
acted upon that interest.20 If the widow had had no interest in the
property, her conveyance would have exercised her power, but she
had a life estate upon which the instrument could operate. If a war-
ranty deed sufficient to convey a fee simple had been executed and
1 Wood v. Robertson, 113 Ind. 323, 15 N.E. 457 (1888); Bruce v.
Bissell, 119 Ind. 525, 22 N.E. 4 (1889); Heilman v. Heilman, 129
Ind. 59, 28 N.E. 310 (1891); Summers v. Old First National Bank
& T. Co., 105 Ind. App. 9, 13 N.E. (2d) 320 (1938).
" Wood v. Robertson, 113 Ind. 323, 15 N.E. 457 (1888) (Life tenant
had power to sell and pay debts of testator and to make advance-
ments to children); Rumsey v. Durham, 5 Ind. 71 (1854); 23
R.C.L. 511-13.
10 See cases cited notes 12, 13 supra. Cotton v. Town of Danville, 301
Mass., 380, 17 N.E. (2d) 209 (1938). The authorities in Illinois
may be contra, Mills v. Newberry, 112 Ill. 123, 1 N.E. 156 (1885);
Coulson v. Alpaugh, 163 Ill. 298, 45 N.E. 216, (1896); Wilce v.
Van Alden, 248 III.. 358, 94 N.E. 42. But a later authority in
that forum implies that the remainder will be held void only
where the power of disposition is sufficient to elevate the life
estate into a fee simple.
17The assignment recited that it was executed under the authority
given by the will but further stated that the widow was assigning
all her right, title and interest in and to the personal property
mentioned.
'sJohnson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 76 F. (2d) 55 (C.C.A.
9th, 1935) cert. denied, 296 U.S. (1935); South v. South, 91
Ind. 221 (1883). Of course, the conveyance must be sufficient
to convey a fee simple.
'9 Equitable Trust Co. v. Causey, 9 A. (2d) 714 (Del. Ch. 1939); Butler
v. Prudden, 182 Ga. 189, 185 S.E. 102 (1936). Contra: Boston
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Prindle, 290 Mass. 577, 195 N.E.
793 (1935).
20 Bullerdick v. Wright, 148 Ind. 477, 47 N.E. 931 (1897) (disposition
by will).
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for an adequate consideration, the power would have been exercised. 21
But a quit claim conveyance, as in the principal case, will not ordi-
narily show an intent to exercise the power because it purports to
convey only the interest possessed by the grantor.2 2 However, the
widow's conveyance executed her power because her intent was clear;
she attempted to set up a trust to exist after her death and her own
property was insufficient for that purpose.23 The absence of a con-
sideration was immaterial because she intended the conveyance to
operate as a gift. V.R.B.
TORTS
RIGHT OF PRIVACY OF PUBLIC CHARACTERS
The defendant published and advertised a biographical sketch of
the plaintiff, a much publicized child prodigy of 30 years ago, under
the title of "Where Are They Now?" showing the present poverty-
stricken position of plaintiff. Plaintiff sued for damages for viola-
tion of his common law right of privacy in states where publication
occurred. Held, for ,defendant. The invasion of the plaintiff's com-
mon law right of privacy was privileged because he is still a subject
of public interest.1
Where the common law right of privacy is recognized,2 it is agreed
21 fDownie v. Buennagel, 94 Ind. 228 (1884); South v. South, 91 Ind.
221 (1883); Rinkenberger v. Meyer, 155 Ind. 152, 56 N.E. 913
(1900).
22 Fraizer v. Hassey, 43 Ind. 310 (1873); Meister v. Francisco, 229
N.W. 643, 127 A.L.R. 242, 248 (Wis. 1940).
28 O'Brien v. Flint, 74 Conn. 502, 51 Atl. 547 (1902). Note (1940)
127 A.L.R. 248.
1 Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corporation, 113 F. (2d) 806 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940).
The court also denied recovery under the NEW YORK Crv RIGHTS
LAW, Secs. 50, 51, (Consol. Laws, C. 6) on the ground that neither
defendant's article nor the picture of plaintiff was published for
purposes of trade within the meaning of the statute. The court
admitted that defendant's article was forecast 'for advertising
purposes' but held that the advertisement shared the same priv-
ilege as the article. Cf. Almind v. Sea Beach Railway Co., 157
App. Div. 230, 141 N.Y. Supp. 842 (2d Dep't 1913). The fact
that plaintiff's name and picture, as required for recovery under
the statute, was not used in the advertisement was stressed. But
that situation is analogous to the principle in libel that reference
to plaintiff need not be direct in publication to constitute libel.
ShaW, Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215
Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932).
2 The right of privacy, usually defined as a personal right "to be let
alone," did not exist at early common law, but was afforded in-
articulate protection in equity when its violation involved: a prop-
erty right, Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng. Rep. R. 670
(ch. 1818); an implied contract, Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 1 H.
& Tw. 28, 47 Eng. Rep. R. 1313 (ch. 1825); or a breach of faith,
Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 J. & W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. R. 425 (ch. 1820).
The first advocation of an explicitly recognized right of privacy
was presented by Warren and Brandeis, The Right To Privacy
(1890) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.
Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) was th first unequivocal
